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Abstract 
 
On November 8, 2016, the Indian government made a surprise announcement that certain 
currency notes (representing 86% of the currency then in circulation) would no longer be 
legal tender (although they could be deposited in banks over a limited period). The stated 
reason for this sudden “demonetization” was to combat tax evasion and corruption 
associated with “unaccounted-for” cash. We compute abnormal returns for firms on the 
Indian stock market around this event, and compare patterns of abnormal returns for 
different subsamples of firms defined by industry, ownership structure, and other 
characteristics. There is little evidence that sectors thought to be associated with greater 
tax evasion or corruption experienced significantly different returns. However, we find 
substantial positive returns for banks and for state owned enterprises (SOEs), implying 
market expectations that are puzzling in some respects. The bank results appear to 
indicate a market expectation of a persistent increase in financial depth. We also find a 
pattern of higher returns for industries that are characterized by a greater dependence on 
external finance, possibly suggesting an expectation of an easing of financial constraints. 
The returns for SOEs may be due to possible indirect effects of the announcement on 
perceptions of future corruption among these firms. 
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1) Introduction 
Corruption and tax evasion are central themes in the study of development, 
having occupied the attention of countless scholarly articles, news stories, development 
agency mandates and legislative agendas.1 On November 8, 2016, a new weapon was 
added to the anti-corruption arsenal when the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, 
gave a surprise address to the nation to announce that from midnight the 500 and 1000 
Indian Rupee (INR) notes would no longer be legal tender.2 Ostensibly, this was being 
done to address concerns with “unaccounted for” cash used for corrupt payments and tax 
evasion. The scale of this announcement is quite staggering – these notes represented 
roughly 86% of the value of currency in circulation in India, an economy in which it is 
estimated that over 90% of transactions are conducted in cash.3 Holders of these notes 
were allowed to deposit them at banks and post offices until December 30, 2016, subject 
to certain restrictions. For instance, they faced substantial penalties unless they were able 
to explain where the money came from and whether it was already taxed; however, there 
was a de minimis exemption from these requirements for smaller deposits.  
The announcement of what has come to be known as “demonetization” was very 
much a surprise, and provides a rare opportunity to not only test the effects of this 
particular initiative but also to derive more general insights into the phenomena of 
corruption and tax evasion. In this paper we conduct an event study around the November 
8, 2016 announcement, analyzing stock market reactions for different subsamples of 
Indian firms defined by industry, ownership structure and other characteristics. Our key 
findings are that the industries thought to be most affected by corruption and tax evasion 
did not experience substantially different market reactions, and that banks and state-                                                        
1 On corruption, see for instance Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), Bardhan (1997), Basu, Basu 
and Cordella (2016), Tanzi (1998) and Sah (2007), among many others. On tax evasion, see the various 
articles collected in Dharmapala (2017). 
2  See Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, New Delhi, Notification No. 2652, 8 
November 2016, available at: http://www.finmin.nic.in/172521.pdf [hereinafter Notification 2016]. This 
was issued under Section 26(2) of the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934, which enables the Central 
Government, on recommendation of the Central Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank of India, to declare 
any series of notes to no longer be legal tender. 
3 See Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report, March 31, 2016 (Part VIII – Currency Management), 
available at: https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualReportPublications.aspx?Id=1181, and Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, Disrupting cash: Accelerating electronic payments in India, available at: 
https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2015/disrupting-cash-accelerating-electronic-payments-in-
india.pdf. Unaccounted-for cash is outside the formal financial system. In the Indian media, it is often 
referred to as “black” money. 
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owned enterprises (SOEs) were positively affected by the announcement. We explore 
some of the implications of these findings below. 
We begin with a simple illustrative model of transactions in the real estate sector, 
where it is thought that unaccounted-for cash is widely used in order to evade a tax 
known as “stamp duty” (e.g. Kulkarni, 2016). We show that under certain assumptions 
the magnitude of the decline in the value of real estate firms around this announcement 
allows us to infer the extent of tax evasion prior to demonetization. We then use daily 
stock price data from the Prowess database and the Bombay Stock Exchange to compute 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the demonetization announcement for real 
estate firms and for various other subgroups of firms (defined using industry and 
ownership categorizations provided by Prowess and various other sources).  
Of course, the stock market’s reactions are just the earliest assessments of 
demonetization’s likely effects. The actual effects will become clearer as time progresses 
and more data becomes available. As of the time of writing, however, these effects 
remain highly uncertain, and the initial stock market reactions thus remain valuable as a 
guide. The predictions of stock market investors may, of course, turn out ultimately to 
have been mistaken. The unprecedented scale of India’s demonetization also makes it 
difficult to predict its effects. Stock market reactions nonetheless represent useful 
information from parties who have their proverbial “ear to the ground” and have strong 
financial incentives to predict these effects correctly. It is sometimes said that journalism 
constitutes the first rough draft of history, and the stock market reactions analyzed in this 
paper can analogously be understood as a first draft of the story of the impact of this 
policy, and its wider implications for understanding corruption and tax evasion. 
It should be emphasized that our aim is not to measure the overall reaction of the 
Indian stock market – which could potentially be affected by other events in the same 
time period – but rather the differential reactions for different subgroups of firms (relative 
to the overall market reaction).4 A particularly noteworthy potential confounding event is                                                         
4 Kumar (2017) studies the impact of the demonetization announcement on analysts’ forecasts of Indian 
firms’ earnings per share, finding no substantial change in these estimates after the announcement. 
However, the focus of Kumar (2017) is not on differences in market reactions across sectors. Jain, Shekhar 
and Deshpande (2017) analyze market reactions, but only for the hospitality industry. In contrast, our 
approach shares some similarities with recent studies of other “surprise” events elsewhere in the world. 
Wagner, Zeckhauser and Ziegler (2017) analyze the stock market reactions around the 2016 US 
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the US Presidential election of November 8, 2016, which took place on the same day and 
also represented a dramatic surprise. While the US election may have affected the general 
level of the Indian market, there does not seem to be any reason to think that it would 
have differentially affected the sectors that we analyze. For example, we do not find 
strong effects for sectors – such as information technology – that have particularly close 
ties to the US, and are not aware of any evidence that specific sectors in non-US markets 
were differentially affected by the US election. 
We find a statistically significant market reaction of around -2% for real estate 
firms. While there are a number of important caveats, it appears that this relatively 
modest magnitude is consistent with either a relatively small amount of tax evasion prior 
to demonetization, or with an expectation that demonetization would have little impact on 
the prevalence of tax evasion. We also find no detectable relationship between the CARs 
experienced by firms around the demonetization announcement and an index of sector-
level perceptions of the prevalence of bribery (constructed by Transparency International 
(2011) based on global survey data, as described in Section 4 below). These findings 
suggest that the market expected the effects of demonetization on corruption and tax 
evasion across the economy to be modest at best. 
Indeed, most identifiable subgroups of Indian firms did not experience 
substantially different reactions in relation to the overall market. The most striking results 
relate to the banking sector and to SOEs. Banks experienced on average about a 6% 
positive and statistically significant abnormal return. This market expectation is 
somewhat puzzling. The observed reaction requires that the market believed that 
demonetization would lead to a substantial and persistent shift in the form of savings, 
from unaccounted-for cash to bank deposits (i.e. an increase in “financial depth”).5 Of 
course, the announcement was expected to lead (as it in fact did) to a massive inflow of 
new deposits at banks. However, to explain a substantial increase in the value of banks’ 
equity, it is necessary that these deposits were expected to not be withdrawn (or                                                                                                                                                                      
Presidential election for subgroups of US firms defined by industry and other characteristics. Ramaiah, 
Pham and Moosa (2017) analyze market reactions for subsets of UK firms around the June 2016 (“Brexit”) 
referendum vote to leave the European Union. Davies and Studnicka (2017) analyze market reactions for 
UK firms to the same event and to subsequent relevant events. They find that UK firms with stronger 
supply chain linkages in Europe experienced more negative market reactions. 
5 The concept of financial depth measures the size of the formal financial sector relative to the size of the 
economy – see e.g. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000). 
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otherwise used for consumption, for instance through electronic payments) in the short-
to-medium term; this would enable banks to increase lending or other profitable 
activities. 
Assessing whether this apparent market expectation was reasonable is quite 
complicated. The government imposed restrictions on withdrawals until March 13, 2017. 
From the available data, it does not seem that there was any noticeable increase in 
withdrawals after the restrictions were lifted. Moreover, for a variety of reasons - legal, 
practical and otherwise (discussed below in Section 5) - we think it unlikely that 
individuals would have withdrawn much of what they deposited.6 Ultimately, it remains 
an open question as to whether most of the new deposits will end up being withdrawn in 
the short-to-medium term, but early evidence suggests withdrawals are quite limited. 
Thus, stock market reactions remain a valuable source of information on perceived 
longer-term effects.   
The market expectation that banks would increase lending is consistent with 
another of our results. We use a sector-level measure of the dependence of an industry on 
external finance, constructed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and updated by Kroszner, 
Laeven and Klingebiehl (2007), and find that the higher an industry’s dependence on 
external finance the larger the CARs it experienced around the demonetization 
announcement. This is consistent with the idea of banks having more investible capital 
(due to new deposits), which is then invested in firms in industries most likely to seek 
external finance. 
We also find that SOEs experienced a positive and significant response of 
between 3% and 4%. This result holds both for SOE banks (in common with non-SOE 
banks) and for nonbank SOEs. The market expectation of an increased value for SOEs is 
in some respects even more puzzling than that for banks. We do not necessarily have a 
complete explanation, but there is some evidence consistent with a story centered on 
expectations of indirect effects on corruption. When the government decided to act in an 
unprecedented manner that carried great political and economic risk, it may have sent a 
(quite costly) signal about its seriousness in curtailing corruption. This may involve in                                                         
6 On November 30, 2016, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) changed the incremental reserve ratio for banks 
to prevent an increase in lending out of the new deposits. However, this measure was short-lived (as it was 
lifted on December 10, 2016) and is thus unlikely to have had much impact. 
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particular a crackdown on corruption at SOEs – either because they are especially prone 
to corruption, or because they are easier for politicians to influence. 
Another related interpretation is that state ownership might serve as a proxy for 
corruption risk. Industries are ranked on corruption risk (e.g. Transparency International 
(2011)) in part due to their interaction with the government (or the degree of regulation 
they face); state ownership involves a particularly high degree of interaction with the 
government. Moreover, it is possible that the extent to which SOEs are susceptible to 
corruption, relative to non-SOEs, is much greater than the differences in corruption 
among non-SOEs that the Transparency International and other indices seek to capture. 
This can potentially explain a large effect for SOEs, even though there is little evidence 
that market reactions to demonetization were related to the prevalence of corruption in 
different industries.  
While there are many important caveats (as discussed above), we think that these 
results are intriguing and worthy of further exploration in future research. As more data 
becomes available, it will be possible to analyze more directly many of the consequences 
of demonetization. However, the initial stock market reactions are a valuable source of 
guidance on expectations about longer-term effects. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the background to the 
November 8, 2016 demonetization. Section 3 discusses the consequences of 
demonetization and how stock market reactions can provide valuable insights. Section 4 
describes our dataset and presents our empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the results 
and their implications. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2) Background 
2.1) Announcements 
On November 8, 2016 at about 8:00pm Indian Standard Time, Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi of India gave an unscheduled television address in which he informed the 
nation that from midnight the INR 500 (~USD 8) and 1000 (~USD 16) notes would no 
longer be legal tender. This represented roughly 86% of the currency in circulation in 
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India, an economy that is estimated to conduct over 90% of its transactions in cash.7  
According to the Prime Minister, this extraordinary step was being taken due to concerns 
about corruption, unaccounted-for cash, and counterfeiting that might aid terrorist 
groups.8 These notes could still be deposited at banks and post offices or exchanged for 
other notes (including the soon-to-be-released new INR 500 notes and INR 2000 notes) 
until December 30, 2016. Thereafter, the old INR 500 and 1000 notes would be 
worthless. Note that the provision of new currency notes makes the demonetization in 
reality a “re-monetization”, but because much of the commentary refers to the events of 
November 8, 2016 as “demonetization” we use that terminology.   
This was soon followed by further announcements from India’s central bank – the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) – and others about how the process would be regulated.  
The old notes would not be recognized as legal tender starting from 12:00am November 
9, 2016, 9  but credit card, debit card and other e-payment systems were not limited 
(Notification 2016). Restrictions were placed on both bank deposits and withdrawals. If 
the amount deposited was below INR 250,000 (~USD $4,000), the depositor would not 
be required to explain where the funds were from (and whether tax was paid on them).10 
However, if the depositor had not yet complied with “Know Your Customer” (KYC) 
norms then the amount deposited could not exceed INR 50,000 (Notification 2016). If the                                                         
7  See Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report, March 31, 2016 (Part VIII – Currency Management), 
available at: https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualReportPublications.aspx?Id=1181.  See also Harish 
Damodaran, “Are Banks equipped to replace 2,300 crore pieces of Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000 notes?”, Indian 
Express, November 9, 2016. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/web-edits/rs-500-rs-
1000-notes-are-banks-equipped-to-replace-1874-crore-pieces-of-notes-4364746/.   
On the size of the cash economy see Price Waterhouse Coopers, Disrupting cash: Accelerating electronic 
payments in India, available at: https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2015/disrupting-cash-
accelerating-electronic-payments-in-india.pdf. 
8 Notification (2016); Abhinav Bhatt, “PM Modi Announces Notes Ban In Anti-Corruption Move, Millions 
Face Cash Crunch” NDTV India, November 8, 2016.  Available at: http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pm-
modi-speaks-to-nation-tonight-at-8-pm-1622948  [hereinafter Modi address 2016]. 
9 See Modi address 2016 and Press Releases, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, New 
Delhi, November 8, 2016 and December 1, 2016. Some exceptions were made for emergencies (e.g., 
paying hospital bills). 
10 This arises by operation of Rule 114B, Income Tax Rules 1962 which lists transactions for which a 
person must quote his or her permanent account number (PAN) – for example, deposits exceeding INR 
250,000 in aggregate in one bank/post office for any one person in the deposit period – November 9, 2016 
to December 30, 2016 (or INR 50,000 in a day in the same period) – and Rule 114E, Income Tax Rules 
1962 which requires banks and post offices to report cash deposits exceeding INR 250,000 in aggregate 
during the deposit period for any non-current accounts held by one person and INR 1,250,000 in aggregate 
for any current accounts held by one person.  These changes to the Income Tax Rules were published on 
November 15, 2016.  See Central Board of Direct Taxes, Notification No. 104/2016 Income Tax, 
November 15, 2016. 
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deposit amount was above INR 250,000 and no acceptable explanation about prior tax 
payments was provided the depositor would have to pay the tax (~30% of the deposit 
amount) and an additional fine/payment.11 Although details of the taxes and penalties to 
be paid for unexplained deposited funds were not released on November 8, 2016, we 
think it reasonable for the market to expect that there would be such taxes and penalties 
based on prior amnesty schemes.12 
There were also limits on the amount that could be withdrawn. Initially, an 
individual could only withdraw INR 4,000 per day from a bank account with a weekly 
limit of INR 20,000 (Notification 2016), which was raised to INR 24,000 a week, then 
INR 50,000 a week and then lifted altogether on March 13, 2017.13 There were also 
limits on withdrawals from ATMs, which started at INR 2,000 per day, but were 
gradually raised and eventually eliminated on February 1, 2017.14                                                         
11 The fine amount varied in the days after November 8, but it was roughly between 20% to 100% in 
addition to the taxes, depending on the circumstances - see Amended Sections 115BBE, 119C to 119R, and 
271AAB(1A) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1962 (Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act 2016, No. 48 
of 2016, available at http://www.egazette.nic.in. The lowest amount that might be paid was if the depositor 
availed of the “Taxation and Investment Regime for Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana” (sections 119C 
to 119R noted above) that required the depositor to pay taxes of 30% on the undisclosed income that is 
being deposited along with a “cess” of 33% of the tax paid (i.e., 10% of the deposit – 33% of 30%) and an 
additional penalty of 10% - a total of 50%.  However, the depositor also had to contribute 25% of the 
deposit amount into a specific deposit scheme for 4 years with no interest.  The money in the scheme was 
to be used for a variety of state projects.  The next highest amount would be under Section 115BBE where 
someone declares undisclosed income but does not put it in the specific deposit scheme.  Here the 
individual pays 30% tax and what amounts to an additional 53.25% more (totaling 83.25%).  Finally, the 
highest amount (under Section 271AAB(1A)) was if the government detected the undisclosed income (i.e., 
the individual did not self report) in which case the tax of 30% would be accompanied by either a penalty 
of about 77% or 107% depending on the circumstances. For instance, a person depositing INR 1,000,000 
without a good explanation on tax payments might pay INR 300,000 as taxes owed and another INR 
530,000 approximately as penalty leaving a net deposit amount of about INR 170,000 (this example 
assumes the depositor fits within amended section 115BBE noted above). 
12 The more recent “amnesty” schemes for “black” money involved depositors paying the taxes and some 
additional fee or penalty.  For example, The Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 (from June 1, 2016 to Sept. 
30, 2016) would allow people to declare income, pay taxes of 30% on it and additional penalties of 15% (a 
total of 45% of the income declared). See Circular No. 16 of 2016, F.No.370142/8/2016-TPL, Government 
of India, Department of Revenue, Central Board of Direct Taxes (TPL Division), May 20, 2016. Also see 
http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Pages/income-declaration-scheme.aspx, and 
http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Pages/ids-2016.aspx.   
13 See Press Release, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, New Delhi, November 13, 
2016; “RBI lifts all cash withdrawal limits from today”, Indian Express, March 13, 2017. Available at: 
http://indianexpress.com/article/business/banking-and-finance/rbi-lifts-all-cash-withdrawal-limits-from-
today-march-13-demonetisation-4567890/.  
14 See “RBI: No limits on cash withdrawals through ATMs from February 1”, Indian Express, January 30, 
2017. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/business/banking-and-finance/rbi-atm-withdrawal-
limit-february-demonetisation-note-ban-4499156/.   There were also limits on the amount of notes that 
could be exchanged for new notes – starting at INR 4,000 per person then INR 4,500 per person and then 
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Unsurprisingly, there was an intense rush to the banks as soon as they opened. 
People were in queues for hours to both deposit and withdraw cash. 15  Given the 
importance of cash transactions in India’s economy, it was essential for even salaried 
individuals (who would have no difficulty showing they paid tax) to have cash on hand 
for daily expenses. The queues were a daily occurrence for weeks and began to diminish 
only as more cash became available and as withdrawal limits were eased.16 
 2.2) Context 
This is the third time in the last 70 years that India has demonetized some part of 
its currency. In 1946, the INR 1000 and 10,000 notes were demonetized, and in 1978 the 
INR 1000, 5,000 and 10,000 notes were demonetized.17 The motivation was similar – to 
try to address concerns with unaccounted-for cash and its accompanying ills. 18  
Demonetization has also occurred in other parts of the world and is typically motivated 
by similar concerns, as well as by inflation and by changes in currency (e.g., upon the 
introduction of the Euro).19 However, the November 8, 2016 demonetization differed                                                                                                                                                                      
back down to INR 2,000 per person with all exchanges being stopped as of November 25, 2016.  See Press 
Release, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, New Delhi, November 17. 2016 and Sunny 
Verma, “All note exchange stopped from today, PM Modi goes back on promise of hike after November 
24”, Indian Express, November 25, 2016.  Available at:  http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-
india/pm-modi-said-exchange-limit-to-be-hiked-after-november-24-exchange-stopped-4393985/.  
15 "Queues get longer at banks, ATMs on weekend", The Hindu, 12 November 2016. Available at: 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Queues-get-longer-at-banks-ATMs-on-
weekend/article16443670.ece, Geeta Anand, “Indians Rush Frantically to Launder Their ‘Black Money’”, 
New York Times, November 20, 2016.  Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/asia/modi-rupees-india-corruption.html, Mayuresh Ganapatye, 
"Demonetisation: Month later, long queues still outside banks and ATMs in Mumbai", India Today, 
December 8, 2016. Available at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/demonetisation-long-queues-banks-
atms-mumbai/1/830100.html.  
16  "28 days of demonetisation: No let-up in rush at banks, ATMs”, Economic Times, December 6, 2016.  
Available at: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/banking/28-days-of-
demonetisation-no-let-up-in-rush-at-banks-atms/articleshow/55838985.cms, George Mathew and 
Khushboo Narayan, "As ATMs dry up, bankers say normalcy will return soon", Indian Express, April 12, 
2017.  Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/business/banking-and-finance/as-atms-dry-up-bankers-
say-normalcy-will-return-soon-4609546/.  
17 Vikram Doctor, "The cycles of demonetisation: A looks back at two similar experiments in 1946 and 
1978", Economic Times Blog, November 12, 2016.  Available at: 
http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/onmyplate/the-cycles-of-demonetisation-a-looks-back-at-two-
similar-experiments-in-1946-and-1978/.  
18 Doctor (2016), Gopika Gopakumar and Vishwanath Nair, "Rs 500, Rs 1000 notes may be back, if history 
is a guide", Live Mint, November 9, 2016. 
19 In the US demonetization is currently prohibited (Coinage Act 1965), but in the past there has been 
demonetization of silver – Friedman (1990), Weinstein (1967).  In the Eurozone see Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 975/98 (1998) of 3 May 1998, in the UK see the Coinage Age 1971 (c. 24) and in Venezuela see 
“Venezuela’s lunatic experiment in demonetization”, The Economist, December 15, 2016.  Available at: 
9
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markedly from earlier episodes in India and elsewhere in its vast scale and in the surprise 
nature of the announcement. Whereas earlier demonetizations in India and elsewhere 
usually affected only the highest value notes in the economy,20 the November 8, 2016 
demonetization targeted fairly moderate-value notes that made up the vast amount of 
currency in circulation (86% is a frequently used estimate). Combined with the surprise 
nature of the announcement - according to some reports, only 10 people in the entire 
country of 1.25 billion people were aware of plans to demonetize21 - this created the 
potential for large scale economic disruption.   
Both the scale and secrecy of this demonetization appear to be in response to 
increased concerns over corruption and unaccounted-for cash. Most global rankings place 
India in the middle of countries in terms of perceived corruption risks, while many 
domestic studies in India suggest high levels of corruption and tax evasion.22 Further, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21711937-nicol-s-maduros-latest-act-economic-
sabotage-cancelling-100-bol-var.  
20 National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, Aspects of Black Money (1985), available at: 
http://www.nipfp.org.in/book/927/, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Measures to Tackle 
Black Money in India and Abroad (2012a), available at: 
http://www.dor.gov.in/sites/upload_files/revenue/files/Measures_Tackle_BlackMoney.pdf, Ministry of 
Finance, Department of Revenue, White Paper on Black Money (2012b), available at: 
http://www.finmin.nic.in/reports/whitepaper_blackmoney2012.pdf. Indeed, targeting high value notes is 
something that has recently been discussed in the US (Rogoff, 2016). 
21  Arup Roychoudhury, "Demonetisation: In the works for 6 months, 10 people in the loop, including 
Raghuram Rajan", Business Standard India, November 10, 2016, available at: http://www.business-
standard.com/article/economy-policy/demonetisation-in-the-works-for-6-months-10-people-in-the-loop-
including-raghuram-rajan-116111000009_1.html. It is noteworthy that banks were aware of the new INR 
2000 note, but not that it was part of a plan to demonetize. The secrecy was apparently considered 
necessary in order to ensure that people who had large amounts of “black” money or corruption rents would 
not have time to funnel the money out of India and avoid the effects of demonetization. In other words, this 
demonetization was presented as attempting to not only effect matters going forward but also to penalize 
those who had already accumulated large amounts of cash in questionable or illicit ways.  One measure of 
the secrecy was a report that the Cabinet was unaware of the plan for demonetization until about one hour 
before the Prime Minister addressed the nation. See Roychoudhury, ibid. 
22 See Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International (2016) ranking India as 79th out of 176 
countries, available at: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016.  In 
addition, it has been noted that corruption is likely holding India’s growth down (Debroy and Bhandari, 
2011; KPMG, Survey on Bribery and Corruption – Impact on Economy and Business  
Environment). See also Nirvikar Singh, “The Trillion Dollar Question”, Financial Express, December 19, 
2010, available at: http://www.financialexpress.com/archive/the-trilliondollar-question/726482/0/, “India’s 
Bureaucracy Ranked Worst in Asia”, BBC News, January 12, 2012, available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-16523672.  
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there have been numerous reports on unaccounted-for cash, and steps taken by the 
Government and the Courts to address it that have met with only limited success.23 
Prior to the November 8, 2016 announcement, the Government of India had 
instituted various “amnesties” for black money and had been engaged in attempting to get 
more people to open bank accounts.24 Although some of these measures had met with 
some success, many others seemed to have languished. Moreover, there appeared to be 
general agreement that for India to continue to grow economically something needed to 
be done to rein in corruption and curtail the spread of unaccounted-for cash, amongst 
other things (e.g. Debroy and Bhandari, 2011, Singh, 2010, Colvin, 2011). 
Against this background, the plans for demonetization appear to have been in 
process for some time. The new INR 2000 note was announced months before November 
2016.25 Further, prior to demonetization there had been efforts made by the government 
to enhance the number of people with identity cards (the “Aadhar” scheme), to open new 
bank accounts for people (the “Jan Dhan” initiative), to have more people with a personal 
account number (“PAN” card), and to enable more mobile banking.26 All of these steps – 
although not necessarily motivated by a plan to demonetize – helped to lay the 
groundwork for demonetization and its potential impact on India. It is also noteworthy                                                         
23  See the citations in fn. 19. The Supreme Court of India also ordered the formation of a Special 
Investigative Team to look into “black” money and to try to recover it.  See Ram Jethmalani & Ors v. 
Union of India & Ors, 2011 8 SCC 1, 
http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/temp/17620093472011p.txt.  The Government of India also has also 
attempted to get information from Swiss Banking authorities on accounts held by Indians that may be a 
repository of “black” money.  See Vicky Nanjappa, “Swiss black money can take India to the top”, 
Rediff.com, March 31, 2009, available at: http://election.rediff.com/interview/2009/mar/31/inter-swiss-
black-money-can-take-india-to-the-top.htm, but see Ministry of Finance (2012b) .Concerns with “black” 
money pre-date India’s Independence in 1947.  See C.W. Ayers, S.P. Chambers and J.B. Vachha, Income 
Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, Submitted to the Government of India as a Result of the Investigation of the 
Indian Income Tax System (1936). 
24 See Ministry of Finance (2012a, 2012b), Ram Jethmalani & Ors. V. Union of India (2011). 
25 Marya Shakil, “Don't Panic, Printing of New Currency Notes Began Months Ago”, CNN-News18, 
available at: http://www.news18.com/news/india/dont-panic-the-printing-of-new-currency-notes-began-
months-ago-1309747.html.  
26 Aadhar Act 2016.  Aadhar is the world’s largest biometric ID system with over 1 billion people being a 
part of it (it is a 12 digit unique-identity number issued to all Indian residents).  See Public Data Portal 
State Wise Saturation, https://uidai.gov.in/.  The “Jan Dhan” initiative (formally “Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan 
Yojana”) is the Government of India’s program for enhancing availability of Financial services to the 
population in an affordable manner – thus far (April 2017) about 280 million bank accounts have been 
opened under the initiative since it started in August 2014, though a number of the accounts have a zero 
balance (about 24% on the latest figures from April 2017).  See www.pmjdy.gov.in. There are plans to use 
this to roll out more mobile banking initiatives. The PAN card is a unique 10-character alpha-numeric 
identifier used for tax purposes in India under the Indian Income Tax Act 1961.  
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that the PAN card when combined with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 
(PMLA) means that any person withdrawing cash above certain amounts from a bank 
account can be tracked under PMLA with the use of the PAN card (which that person 
must have in order to obtain a bank account). Of course, whether this tracking will 
happen remains to be seen, but the scaffolding appears to be in place. This tracking 
infrastructure can potentially explain why it may be difficult to use cash that has been 
deposited in the banking system subsequently for corrupt activities.27 
2.3) Initial Responses 
Following the demonetization announcement, there was a scramble by the general 
public to find ways to get value for their currency notes for which they did not have proof 
of taxes being paid. A variety of schemes have been reported, including the purchase of 
jewelry,28 purchasing tickets on Indian Railways (an arm of the Government) to then later 
cancel the tickets and get “official” cash back from the Railways,29 bribing bank and 
government officials, backdating accounting entries, and giving money to temples in 
order to get it back later in some form.30                                                         
27 We do not discuss how parties in India generate and then launder “black” money. For more discussion, 
see the Ministry of Finance publications cited above and Jindal (2016). 
28 Rutam Vora, “Gold rush keeps jewelers buzzing past midnight”, Business Line, The Hindu, November 9, 
2016.  Available at: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/markets/gold/gold-rush-kept-jewellers-buzzing-
past-midnight/article9323397.ece.  
29  Manthank Mehtal, "Railways sets Rs. 5000 as cash refund limit for tickets", Times of India, November 
16, 2016.  Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Rlys-sets-5000-as-cash-refund-
limit-for-tickets/articleshow/55444673.cms, “No cash refunds for cancelled tickets above Rs. 10,000, The 
New Indian Express, November 10, 2016. Available at: 
http://www.newindianexpress.com/business/2016/nov/10/no-cash-refunds-for-cancelled-tickets-above-rs-
10000-1537114.html, Siddharth Prabhakari, "Railway tickets booked between Nov 16 and 24 for Rs 5,000 
and above won’t be refunded in cash", Times of India, November 15, 2016.  Available at: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Railway-tickets-booked-between-Nov-16-and-24-for-Rs-5000-
and-above-wont-be-refunded-in-cash/articleshow/55439814.cms.  
30  Pranshu Rathi, "Back-dated receipts used for Apple iPhone sales after demonetisation: Report", IB 
Times, November 29, 2016, available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.in/back-dated-receipts-used-apple-iphone-
sales-after-demonetisation-report-706095, Khushboo Narayan, "Tiffin service to dental implants: All tried 
to beat system, swap old notes", Indian Express, December 5, 2016.  Available at: 
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/demonetisation-tiffin-service-to-dental-implants-all-tried-to-beat-
system-swap-old-notes-income-tax-department-raids-4410874/, Appu Esthose Suresh "Demonetisation 
violation? Banks accepted over Rs 1 lakh crore without PAN details", Hindustan Times, March 16, 2017.  
Available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/demonetisation-in-possible-violation-banks-
accepted-over-1-crore-lakh-deposits-without-pan/story-bQbHbFtBgggK7fFh5j0jqI.html, Madhuparna Das, 
"Enforcement Directorate raids forex shops making back date entries", Economic Times, November 16, 
2016.  Available at: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/enforcement-
directorate-raids-forex-shops-making-back-date-entries/articleshow/55373554.cms, Ram Sehgal, 
“Jewellers issue backdated invoices to clients”, Economic Times, November 10, 2016.  Available at: 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/commodities/news/jewellers-issue-backdated-invoices-to-
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As the government sought to block these types of schemes, it appears that people 
started trying to deposit money into bank accounts of other people (typically those with 
less than INR 250,000 to deposit) in order to avoid questioning on the source and tax 
status of the income.31 This of course involved a fair amount of risk that the depositor 
might not give the money back to the original party. It appears that intermediaries arose 
(seemingly instantaneously) who would – for a price – offer to help someone split their 
cash into smaller chunks and have people ready to deposit who would later give back the 
money.32 As this method of evasion became noticeable, the government began to use 
indelible ink marks on depositors’ fingers to ensure that such “marked” depositors would 
find it more difficult to deposit again.33 
 Despite such government responses, it appears clear that many people were able 
circumvent the restrictions and deposit their cash (at some cost). This is perhaps most 
clearly indicated by how much cash came into the banks by December 30, 2016. Prior to 
demonetization estimates of the total amount of unaccounted for currency were in the 
range of INR 15.4 Trillion, of which a staggering INR 14.97 Trillion was deposited by 
December 30, 2016 (roughly 97% and amounting to about USD 220 Billion).34 This 
suggests that either the initial estimate of unaccounted for money was too low or that 
people evaded the restrictions or some mix of both.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
clients/articleshow/55349735.cms.  
31  Khushboo Narayan, “Expect all demonetised money to come back to system: Revenue Secretary 
Hasmukh Adhia”, Indian Express, December 8 2016. Available at: 
 http://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/expect-all-demonetised-money-to-come-back-to-
system-revenue-secretary-hasmukh-adhia-4414447/.  
32 Swati Bhat and Rahul Bhatia, “While India plugs black money holes, Indians find leaks”, Reuters, 
November 11, 2016.  Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-modi-corruption-taxes-
idUSKBN1360UO.  
33 "To reduce crowds at banks, ATMs, indelible ink to mark fingers of those who have exchanged old 
notes", Times of India, November 15, 2016. Available at: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indelible-ink-to-mark-fingers-of-those-who-have-exchanged-
cash/articleshow/55431492.cms, Surabhi, “Now, an indelible mark to stop multiple note swaps”, Business 
Line, The Hindu, November 15, 2016.  Available at: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/money-and-
banking/banks-to-use-indelible-ink-to-prevent-repeated-withdrawals-by-same-person/article9348231.ece.  
34 Siddhartha Singh and Bibhudatta Pradhan,"As much as 97% of the Banned Notes Are Back in Banks: 
Report". NDTV, January 5, 2017.  Available at: http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indians-said-to-deposit-
97-of-notes-banned-to-curb-graft-1645071, "97% of scrapped notes deposited with banks as on Dec 30: 
Report”, Times of India, January 5, 2017. Available at:  
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-features/business/97-of-scrapped-notes-deposited-with-banks-as-on-
dec-30-report/articleshow/56344692.cms.  
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 This outcome has been viewed by some in the media as a partial failure of 
demonetization. 35  Over time, the political discourse surrounding demonetization has 
shifted, with the Government suggesting that one of its goals was to get more money into 
the formal sector and jumpstart “cash-less” or e-payments structures. 36 Although that 
might be viewed as making lemonade from lemons, it is clear that the Government had 
for some time been trying to increase the size of the banked population and to increase 
the amount of funds in the formal economy.37 
 The economic disruption caused by demonetization led to the International 
Monetary Fund revising downwards India’s estimated rate of economic growth. 38 
However, while demonetization has undoubtedly caused serious disruptions, fears of 
widespread unrest and chaos have not materialized. For instance, some opposition parties 
called for strikes and other kinds of resistance activities.39 There were also lawsuits filed 
against the demonetization process, but thus far those suits have not borne fruit.40 Despite 
these signs of opposition, there has been little political cost of demonetization to the                                                         
35 See “Demonetisation complete failure? 97% of banned notes back in banks: Report”, Indian Express, 
January 5, 2017.  Available at:  
http://indianexpress.com/article/business/banking-and-finance/demonetisation-complete-failure-97-of-
banned-notes-back-in-banks-report/.  
36 Anuradha Sharma, “If India's Demonetization Was All About Going Digital, Then Why the Rush?”, The 
Diplomat, December 1, 2016, Available at:  
http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/if-indias-demonetization-was-all-about-going-digital-then-why-the-rush/.  
37 See Sharma (2016); which is also bolstered by the Government’s efforts toward Aadhar, Jan Dhan and 
PAN cards amongst others discussed earlier in the text. 
38 See “Note ban: IMF cuts India's growth rate to 6.6% from 7.6%” Times of India, January 16, 2017, 
available at:  
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/note-ban-imf-cuts-indias-growth-rate-to-6-6-
from-7-6/articleshow/56601209.cms.  
39 "Demonetisation: Opposition calls for countrywide protest on November 28”, Indian Express, November 
23, 2016.  Available at:  
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/demonetisation-oppostion-parties-countrywide-
protest-bandh-call-november-28-4391208/, Manoj CG, "Demonetisation: Opposition parties join hands, to 
hold 'protest day' on November 28", Indian Express, November 24, 2016.  Available at: 
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/demonetisation-opposition-parties-join-hands-to-hold-
protest-day-on-november-28-4391937/.  
40 Given the time that has elapsed, one suspects the demonetization would either be held to be legal or a fait 
accompli such that the courts may not intervene. Vidya Venkat, Government’s Demonetisation Move Faces 
Legal Challenge, The Hindu, December 2, 2016.  Available at: 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Government%E2%80%99s-demonetisation-move-faces-legal-
challenge/article16744775.ece.  “Five Reasons Why the Recent Demonetisation May Be Legally 
Unsound”, The Wire, November 20, 2016.  Available at:  
https://thewire.in/81325/demonetisation-legally-unsound/. The Delhi High Court ruled that the withdrawal 
restrictions on cash were not illegal.  See Ashok Sharma v. Union of India [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 
11130/2016, order dated 02.12.2016], although this has been appealed to a full Constitution Bench of the 
Supreme Court of India. 
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governing party. On the contrary, the Prime Minister and his political party (the BJP) 
have done very well in state elections following the announcement of demonetization.41  
 
3) Stock Market Reactions and the Consequences of Demonetization  
3.1) A Simple Illustrative Model of Tax Evasion in the Real Estate Sector 
Extensive tax evasion via the use of unaccounted-for cash has been anecdotally 
discussed in India’s real estate sector (e.g. Kulkarni, 2016). In this section, we develop a 
simple model of evasion in the purchase of real estate. While the model is highly stylized, 
it illustrates how estimates of changes in the value of real estate firms around the 
demonetization announcement of November 8 can potentially be useful in inferring the 
magnitude of tax evasion. 
The Indian Stamp Act of 1899 imposed a tax based on the value of transactions in 
real property, known as “stamp duty” (e.g. Alm, Annez and Modi, 2004). This tax 
continues to be imposed on sales of property, with the rate varying across states; for 
illustrative purposes below, we use a rate of 10% of the property value, which is fairly 
typical. The legal incidence of stamp duty falls on the buyer of property. However, as 
illustrated by the bargaining framework we use below, the economic incidence will 
generally be shared by the buyer and seller. Thus, evasion of stamp duty will in general 
raise the value of firms selling real estate. 
Assume a real estate company that constructs or purchases a building at a cost of 
C. It then sells the building to a buyer who values it at V > C. Stamp duty is imposed on 
this transaction at a rate t, based on the reported sale price. For instance, if the parties 
report the true price paid (defined as P0), then a tax of tP0 must be paid. Prior to the 
demonetization announcement, however, the buyer can use unaccounted-for cash for part 
of the payment, and so the parties can report a price lower than P0 in order to reduce the 
amount of stamp duty paid.  
                                                        
41 See Ravi Agrawal, “Why the Indian State Elections Matter to the Whole World”, CNN, March 13. 2017.  
Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/11/asia/uttar-pradesh-elections/index.html, “Uttar Pradesh 
election results: All You Need To Know”, Times of India, March 11, 2017.  Available at: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/elections/assembly-elections/uttar-pradesh/news/uttar-pradesh-elections-
2017-results-all-you-need-to-know/articleshow/57585921.cms.  
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In an effort to limit underreporting, many Indian states have imposed a minimum 
presumptive value of property - known as the “circle rate” - for purposes of stamp duty.42 
Suppose that there is a minimum value M that can be reported, based on the circle rate 
that is defined by the state government’s revenue authority. As long as the circle rate is 
below the market value (as is likely to be the case when property values are rising and 
circle rates are revised infrequently) there is some scope for evasion. In our simple 
setting, the parties always choose to report a price of M. 
The true price P0 is assumed to be determined by a process of Nash bargaining 
between the seller and the buyer, with the seller obtaining a fraction α of the joint surplus. 
Thus, the true price P0 can be defined as follows: 
𝑃𝑃0 = 𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉 − 𝐶𝐶 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)                                     (1) 
The amount of underreporting is thus (P0 – M); the buyer pays M using regular 
(“accounted-for”) funds and (P0 – M) using unaccounted-for cash. The ratio of the 
reported to the true price (on which we focus below) is 𝑀𝑀
𝑃𝑃0
. The value of the real estate 
firm, П0, is defined as the price it receives, minus its cost. Thus, 
      Π0 = 𝑃𝑃0 − 𝐶𝐶                                                          (2) 
Note that the government observes M (the reported price), but not 𝑉𝑉  and 𝑃𝑃0 . In a 
complete information setting, it would be possible to infer 𝑃𝑃0 using Equation (1) above. 
However, this is not possible for the government – even if the cost C is known – if it does 
not know the buyer’s valuation 𝑉𝑉. 
 Now, suppose that a change – such as the demonetization – makes it impossible 
for buyers to use unaccounted-for cash. Then, all of the funds used for payment are 
traceable, and the parties must, by assumption, report the true price P1. This price can 
thus be defined as: 
𝑃𝑃1 = 𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉 − 𝐶𝐶 − 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃1)                                     (3) 
Rearranging,  
𝑃𝑃1 = (1−𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶+𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼1+𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼                                                       (4) 
The real estate firm’s profits are now given by: 
                                                        
42 See e.g. Madalasa Venkataraman “Setting Circle Rates for Urban Property Transactions” Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol. L, No. 11, March 14, 2015, pp. 26-29. 
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Π1 = 𝑃𝑃1 − 𝐶𝐶                                                          (5) 
Note that, in general, 𝑃𝑃1 < 𝑃𝑃0. 
 The proportional change in firm value upon the announcement of the policy 
change that eliminates unaccounted-for cash can be characterized as follows:  
      ∆Π ≡ 𝛱𝛱1−𝛱𝛱0
𝛱𝛱0
= 𝑃𝑃1−𝑃𝑃0
𝑃𝑃0−𝐶𝐶
                                              (6) 
The event study approach that we use is capable of estimating ∆Π. Thus, assuming that C 
can be observed, it is possible to infer the unknown value of 𝑃𝑃0  by rearranging the 
equation above: 
𝑃𝑃0 = 𝑃𝑃1+𝐶𝐶∆𝛱𝛱1+∆𝛱𝛱                                                            (7) 
The magnitude of the estimated ∆Π  can be used to infer the extent of tax evasion 
behavior prior to the withdrawal of cash. For instance, consider a simple numerical 
example where C = 80, V = 150, and t = 10%. It follows from Equation (4) that 𝑃𝑃1 = 
109.5. Suppose that the estimated ∆Π = 2%. From Equation (7), we can then infer that 𝑃𝑃0 
= 110. Note that this is consistent with M = 100 – rearranging Equation (1) yields: 
    𝑡𝑡 = (1−𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶+𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−𝑃𝑃0
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
 = 100                                                   (8) 
It follows that the extent of evasion, as measured by the ratio of the reported price to the 
true price is 100/110, or approximately 90%. Thus, an estimated ∆Π = 2% would be 
consistent with evasion being relatively modest in magnitude. 
 Alternatively, suppose that (under assumptions that are otherwise the same), the 
estimated ∆Π = 8%. From the equation above, we can then infer that 𝑃𝑃0 = 112. Note that 
this is consistent with M = 60 – rearranging Equation (1) yields: 
    𝑡𝑡 = (1−𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶+𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−𝑃𝑃0
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
 = 60                                                     (9) 
It follows that the extent of evasion, as measured by the ratio of the reported price to the 
true price is 60/112, or approximately 54%. Thus, an estimated ∆Π  = 8% would be 
consistent with evasion being substantial in magnitude, with only a little over half the 
payment being in accounted-for cash. This simple example illustrates that the estimated 
impact of demonetization on the value of firms can potentially be useful in inferring the 
magnitude of tax evasion. 
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 This is of course a highly stylized model. For demonetization to have a substantial 
impact on tax evasion, it is necessary that a large fraction of unaccounted-for wealth was 
held in cash, and specifically in the form of 500 and 1000 INR notes. However, the 
available evidence suggests that unaccounted-for wealth is mostly held in other forms, 
such as jewelry, foreign currency, and various types of assets (Chakravorti, 2017). 
Moreover, it is also necessary that remonetization (through the newly issued notes) does 
not enable the use of cash for tax evasion to the same extent as before. As discussed 
earlier, once money is in the formal sector then it becomes traceable by the authorities. In 
particular, various Income Tax Rules and PMLA provisions require reporting of large 
withdrawals. In principle, this may deter the use of the new notes for tax evasion, but 
much depends on the efficacy of this tracing process. 
 Unaccounted-for cash is thought to be widely used not only for tax evasion 
purposes, but also for making corrupt payments. Similar considerations apply in 
determining whether it is likely that demonetization could reduce corrupt payments. It 
would have to be the case that corrupt payments were frequently made in the form of 
unaccounted-for cash in 500 and 1000 INR notes. Moreover, it would also have to be the 
case that the traceability of the new notes issued after demonetization deters their use in 
future corrupt payments to a significant degree. 
3.2) Other Hypotheses  
 Although corruption and tax evasion were the issues most discussed by the 
government and the media in relation to demonetization, there are other effects to 
consider. For example, stock market reactions may vary across industries because 
corruption is more prevalent in certain sectors. To the extent that demonetization is 
anticipated to reduce corruption, firms in these sectors may be harmed because corrupt 
payments can no longer be used to evade burdensome regulations; on the other hand, they 
may benefit because the informal “tax” associated with corrupt payments to officials is 
reduced. In the empirical analysis, we use a measure of the prevalence of corruption 
across different sectors (constructed by Transparency International (2011)) to test for 
such effects. Further, it is also possible that industries that are thought to serve as 
repositories for unaccounted-for cash (such as real estate and jewelry) may experience 
negative returns. 
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 Because the demonetization process entailed large deposits in the banking system, 
it is possible that banks are particularly affected by the November 8 announcement. In 
particular, if it were anticipated that a substantial fraction of the deposits would not be 
immediately withdrawn upon remonetization, then the banks would have additional net 
deposits that could potentially be lent out and generate returns. On the other hand, the 
demonetization was, as previously described, accompanied by a remonetization; thus, it is 
possible that the increase in deposits would be purely transitory, with similar amounts 
being rapidly withdrawn upon the availability of the new notes. In this latter scenario, no 
major impact on banks’ profitability would be expected. 
 Related to this, the industries that are more dependent on the type of financing 
banks provide stand to benefit too because their capital constraints have been eased when 
banks have more funds available to lend. Industries which are more dependent on 
external finance than others (e.g., pharmaceuticals) are the ones most likely to benefit 
from this. In addition, industries that thrive in online environments are also likely to 
benefit. 
 In addition to industry effects, it appears useful to examine the effects on firms 
based on their ownership structure. For example, many Indian firms belong to family run 
business groups that are thought to keep fairly opaque accounts of inter-affiliate 
transactions (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). These firms may present different risks than do 
standalone private Indian firms or foreign-owned firms. SOEs may behave differently 
along many dimensions, both because they have a mandate that goes beyond profit-
making and because they have more interaction with the State than do other firms. This 
latter consideration is often a key basis used by organizations in ranking more corrupt 
industries. SOEs have greater interactions with the State and hence may have more 
opportunities for corrupt practices.  We discuss this possibility further in Section 5 
because the connection between ownership structure and corruption has not been 
something on which most scholars or organizations ranking corruption seem to focus.43 
This summary indicates that the effects of demonetization are likely to be 
multifarious and some may take years to be visible in the data. In light of this, our                                                         
43 There is little if any literature on this point.  One paper that uses SOEs in a corruption context is Ke, Liu 
and Tang (2017) but they do not provide a theoretical explanation for why SOEs might be different than 
other firms from the perspective of corruption.  We discuss that issue in greater depth in Section 5. 
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research strategy is to examine the market’s reaction to this sudden announcement. We 
note again that there are reasons to think the market may not fully estimate all effects and 
many things may be unknown at the time of the market reaction, but the market reaction 
does reflect the perceptions of a number of individuals and groups that are thought to 
have a good sense of the pulse of the economy. Their reactions are worthy of exploration 
and their initial inclinations may contain information of relevance in assessing some of 
the effects of demonetization. It is to this that we now turn. 
 
4) Data and Empirical Strategy 
4.1) Data 
Our study uses daily stock price trading data to examine the market’s assessment 
of the likely effects of demonetization around its announcement on November 8, 2016. 
Stock price data is obtained from Prowess, a comprehensive database on publicly traded 
Indian firms that is maintained by the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy 
(CMIE). Stock price data is available in Prowess for each trading day. At the time the 
analysis was conducted, Prowess provided stock price data to the end of the third quarter 
of 2016 (i.e., September 30, 2016). As our event study analysis requires daily stock price 
data through November 15, 2016, we augment the Prowess data by hand-collecting price 
data from the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE; the same source on which Prowess stock 
prices are based) for the relevant period (October 1, 2016 to November 15, 2016). We 
match the stock price data for firms across these sources to ensure consistent treatment of 
firms. 
Prowess also provides financial statement data reported on an annual basis, as of 
the end of each fiscal year (i.e. March 31 of a given year). For the regression analysis 
described below, we match the event date to the closest corresponding fiscal year to 
obtain the corresponding financial statement data (in particular, the November 8, 2016 
event date is matched to the 2016 fiscal year, the most recently completed fiscal year as 
of that event date). Our regression analysis uses data on total assets, sales, profits (in 
particular, profits before depreciation, interest and taxes), advertising, and marketing 
expenses from the “consolidated accounts” reported in Prowess. As advertising and 
marketing have a substantial number of missing values, we follow past literature using 
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Prowess data (e.g. Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013, 2016a) and treat missing observations 
of advertising and marketing expenses as zeroes. Prowess also reports the ownership 
structure of each firm – i.e. whether it is part of a business group, under foreign 
ownership, or an SOE. We use these ownership variables in our analysis, for instance to 
construct an indicator variable for SOEs. 
Prowess classifies firms into industries using a 5-digit National Industrial 
Classification (NIC) code. We use the NIC codes to construct indicator variables for 
specific industries of relevance for our analysis. For example, we construct an indicator 
variable for banks using the NIC code 64191 (which encompasses “banking services” and 
“other fee based financial services”). Similarly, we construct an indicator for firms in the 
real estate sector using NIC codes 68100 (“commercial complexes”) and 41001 
(“housing construction”).  
 For some of our tests, we use additional data sources. We obtain from 
Transparency International (2011) a sector-level index of perceptions of bribery. The 
index is based on a global survey of business executives, and represents an average of the 
responses to three questions in Transparency International’s “Bribe Payers Survey”. 
Respondents were asked “How often do firms in each sector: a) engage in bribery of low-
level public officials, for example to speed up administrative processes and/or facilitate 
the granting of licenses?; b) use improper contributions to high-ranking politicians or 
political parties to achieve influence?; and c) pay or receive bribes from other private 
firms?” The resulting index takes on values from 0-10, where higher values indicate less 
corruption. Transparency International (2011) reports this index for 19 different sectors, 
ranging from “agriculture” and “light manufacturing” (each of which has the highest 
value of 7.1, indicating a relatively low susceptibility to corruption) to “public works 
contracts and construction” (with a value of 5.3, the most corrupt sector). Note that these 
perceptions of corruption are not specific to India, but rather represent a global 
assessment by sector. We match these 19 sectors by hand to the 5-digit NIC codes in 
Prowess. Of the approximately 3000 firms for which we have stock price data, we match 
2125 to sectors that are covered by the Transparency International (2011) index. 
 We also conduct a test of the relationship between stock market reactions to 
demonetization and a measure of the dependence of different sectors on external finance. 
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Rajan and Zingales (1998) construct a measure of the extent to which firms in a given 
industry depend on external financing for investment needs. This measure is based on the 
difference between cash flows from operations and capital expenditures for US 
manufacturing firms, at the industry level, computed using Compustat data for the 
1980’s. Higher values of the measure indicate that an industry has a greater need for 
external finance (i.e. that its capital expenditures exceed its cash flows from operations). 
While this measure is based on US data, it is intended to reflect fundamental 
technological characteristics of different industries, and has been widely used in studies 
of countries around the world. We use an updated version of the Rajan-Zingales measure, 
constructed by Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiehl (2007), using Compustat data for US 
manufacturing firms for the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
 The Rajan-Zingales measure is reported only for manufacturing industries, using 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) codes for industries. We translate 
these ISIC industry codes to the 5-digit NIC codes used in Prowess using a concordance 
between the ISIC and NIC systems created by Sivadasan (2009).44 Of the approximately 
3000 firms for which we have stock price data, we match 1516 to sectors that are covered 
by the Rajan-Zingales measure (bearing in mind that the latter only exists for 
manufacturing industries). 
4.2) Event Study Approach 
The event of interest in our study is the announcement by the Prime Minister on 
November 8, 2016. As the announcement was made in the evening after the close of 
trading, we treat the event date as being November 9, 2016 (the first day on which news 
of the announcement could have affected prices). Using daily stock price data from 
Prowess, supplemented by hand-collected price data from the Bombay Stock Exchange,  
we compute abnormal returns for the firms in our sample over (-1, +1), (-2, +2), and (-3, 
+3) event windows, where day zero is November 9, 2016. For example, for the (-3, +3) 
window, we calculate the market reaction for each firm over a period extending from 3 
trading days prior to the event to 3 trading days following the event). 
                                                        
44 We are grateful to Jagadeesh Sivadasan for providing this concordance, and to Rafeh Qureshi of the 
Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics for assistance with the matching of these codes. 
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Event studies use a variety of approaches to estimate firms’ normal or predicted 
returns. We use the market model, which does not rely on any specific economic 
assumptions. The market model uses daily returns for each firm i and for the market, and 
can be represented as follows (e.g. Bhagat and Romano, 2002, p. 146; Dharmapala and 
Khanna, 2016a, b): 
𝑅𝑅it = 𝑎𝑎i + 𝑏𝑏i𝑡𝑡t + 𝑒𝑒it             (10) 
where Rit is firm i’s return on day t, 𝑡𝑡t is the market return on day t, and 𝑒𝑒it is the error 
term. We run this regression separately for each firm over an estimation window that 
consists of a year of daily returns data prior to the (-3, +3) event window. We use the 
results to compute a predicted return for each firm on each day of the relevant event 
window. We then subtract this predicted return from the actual return on each day of the 
event window to obtain the abnormal return for each firm i on each of the days in the 
event window. These abnormal returns are then summed to compute cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) for each firm for each of the event windows. To address 
potential outliers, the CARs are Winsorized at 5%. 
We then use a straightforward ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression to test how 
these CARs vary with industry, ownership structure, and other firm characteristics. This 
regression specification can be represented as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘+1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘+2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘+3𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖   (11) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the CAR computed for firm i around the event date, as described above, and 𝛼𝛼 is 
a constant. For each of k different industries, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is an indicator variable that is equal to 
one if firm i belongs to industry j, and is zero otherwise. For instance, we focus on 
specific industries of interest, such as banking and real estate. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  is an indicator 
variable equal to one for firms classified by Prowess as state-owned. 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  is an 
indicator variable equal to one for firms classified by Prowess as belonging to a business 
group. 𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to one for firms classified by Prowess as being 
foreign-owned. 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖 is a vector of control variables (in the main reported results, these are 
total assets, profits, advertising expenditures, marketing expenses, and sales), and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 is 
the error term.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the CARs for each of the event windows, as 
well as for the other variables used in the regression analysis. Note that the number of 
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firms for which we are able to compute CARs varies slightly across the different 
windows. This is because, for instance, a firm may have missing price data on the +1 day, 
making it impossible to compute the (-1, +1) CAR, while it has price data on days +2 and 
+3, enabling the computation of CARs for the longer windows. 
 
5) Results and Discussion 
5.1) Basic Results 
Table 2 presents the mean CAR for firms in each of three particularly noteworthy 
sectors, using the (-3, +3) window. Standard errors are computed by regressing the CARs 
for the firms in each category on a constant. Note, however, that inferences using 
bootstrapped standard errors are very similar to those using the conventional standard 
errors reported in Table 2. As shown in Table 2, the CARs experienced by firms in the 
real estate sector was around -2%, and is statistically significant. This is consistent with 
our hypothesis that the real estate sector would be negatively impacted as it serves as a 
repository for unaccounted-for cash. However, the magnitude of this effect is relatively 
modest; it is similar to that in the first of the two stylized scenarios described in Section 
3.1 (see Equation (8)), where the fraction of real estate prices paid in the form of 
unaccounted-for cash is quite small. Alternatively, it may be the case that tax evasion is 
widespread, while the modest market reaction reflects an expectation that demonetization 
would have little impact on the prevalence of tax evasion. 
However, we wish to highlight some important caveats. First, our results are only 
for publicly traded firms, and there are of course many real estate firms that are not 
publicly traded. Moreover, the publicly traded firms must disclose to the market more 
than private firms and hence may tend to be more transparent. Second, the real estate 
market may be subject to offsetting effects. For example, if banks received a large long-
term infusion of funds then one of the markets in which they may disburse those funds is 
the home mortgage market (given its high growth rate in recent years (Khanna, 2017)), 
which would then have a positive effect on the real estate sector. Further, to the extent 
that people believe unaccounted-for cash will be less prevalent in real estate going 
forward then perhaps additional investment might come into real estate and that could 
have an offsetting effect (McMillan, 2016). 
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Generally consistent with this result for the real estate sector is the absence of any 
detectable relationship between the CARs we compute and the Transparency 
International index of sector-level corruption. As there are only a limited number of 
values that this index takes on, Figure 1 shows a scatterplot that represents the mean CAR 
for each value of the index. It also shows a line of best fit, computed using all of the 
CARs (as opposed to just the mean CARs for each index value). This line is essentially 
horizontal. Moreover, regressing the CARs on the corruption index yields a coefficient 
that is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
Overall, these findings suggest that the market expected the effects of 
demonetization on corruption and tax evasion across the economy to be modest at best. In 
contrast, the results for banks and SOEs are rather more striking. Table 2 shows that the 
mean CAR for firms in the banking sector is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. The effect is large (around 6%) and seems to indicate that investors expected 
the banking sector to benefit from demonetization, despite the various arguments 
discussed in Section 3 for why any impact on bank profits may be limited. Our third 
result relates to SOEs, which had a mean CAR that is both positive and significant at the 
1% level. The effect is fairly large (4%) and consistent with our hypothesis that SOEs 
may be impacted differently than other types of firms. We explore potential explanations 
for this in our discussion below. 
As all firms experienced the Prime Ministerial announcement on the same day, a 
potential problem for inference is the possibility of cross-correlation of returns across 
firms within the same sector on the event dates. One approach to addressing this potential 
problem is to aggregate the firms within a given sector into a single portfolio and to 
estimate the portfolio CARs around the event date (e.g. Kothari and Warner, 2007). This 
procedure renders moot any cross-correlation among the returns of firms within sectors. 
We thus aggregate all the banks in our sample into a single bank portfolio. The abnormal 
returns for this bank portfolio within the (-3, +3) window are shown in Figure 2. There is 
a large positive abnormal return of over 5% on November 9 that is statistically significant 
(the test statistic is 2.4). This is followed by positive portfolio returns on the subsequent 
two days that are smaller in magnitude, although not statistically significant. A very 
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similar pattern exists for a portfolio consisting of all SOEs in our sample, as shown in 
Figure 3. 
Table 3 reports the results of the regression specification shown in Equation (11), 
for all three of the event windows. The final column of Table 3 adds in the financial 
statement variables in the vector X as controls. The strong results for banks and SOEs are 
robust to adding these controls (as well as the various industry and ownership dummies). 
The magnitudes over the (-3, + 3) window are also quite close to those in Table 2. The 
effect for real estate is again negative, but relatively modest in magnitude and not 
consistently significant across the event windows. Differential effects for foreign-owned 
and business group firms are small in magnitude and generally insignificant. There is also 
no other industry that experiences market reactions that are consistently significant across 
the event windows, and the magnitudes are generally small. The one exception is the 
pharmaceutical and health sector, which we discuss below in the context of the results 
relating to industries’ external financial dependence. 
As the US presidential election of November 8, 2016 has the potential to 
confound these effects (as discussed earlier in the Introduction), it is noteworthy that the 
information technology sector – which has close ties to the US and is potentially 
vulnerable to US trade and immigration policies – experiences only small (and 
statistically insignificant) market reactions. This reinforces our earlier point that it is 
unlikely that the US election would have a substantial impact in India at the industry 
level, even though it may well have affected the general level of the Indian market around 
this time. 
5.2) The Banking Sector and Financial Constraints 
It appears that investors anticipated at the time of demonetization that the profits 
of banks would be positively affected. This entails an expectation that demonetization 
would result in a persistent (rather than transitory) increase in financial sector deposits. 
Indeed, the observed reaction requires that the market believed that demonetization 
would lead to a substantial and persistent shift in the form of savings by the public in 
India, specifically from unaccounted-for cash to bank deposits. Of course, the 
announcement was expected to lead (as it in fact did) to a massive inflow of new deposits 
at banks. However, to explain a substantial increase in the value of banks’ equity, it is 
26
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 136 [2017]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/136
 26 
necessary that these deposits were expected to not be withdrawn (or otherwise used for 
consumption, for instance through electronic payments) in the short-to-medium term. 
This scenario would enable banks to increase lending or other profitable activities. 
One approach to exploring the banking sector result further is to look at the 
industries that would be most likely to receive some of the incremental investible funds 
that investors seem to have expected banks to receive as a result of demonetization. To do 
so, we use the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of external financial dependence 
(updated by Kroszner et al. (2007), as described in Section 4). Table 4 reports regressions 
of the CARs on the external dependence measure. We control for an industry’s corruption 
perception according to Transparency International (2011), and in Column 4 we control 
for the same set of financial statement variables as in Table 3. We find a positive and 
statistically significant relationship across all event windows. The implied magnitude 
entails that a one standard deviation increase in the external dependence measure is 
associated with about a 0.7 percentage point higher CAR around the event (e.g. if the 
counterfactual return were -1%, then the firm would experience a -0.3% return as a result 
of having external dependence that is one standard deviation higher).  
A similar pattern can be observed in Figure 4, which presents a scatterplot of the 
results. As there are only a limited number of values that the external dependence 
measure takes on, Figure 4 shows a scatterplot that represents the mean CAR for each 
value of the index. It also shows a line of best fit, computed using all of the CARs (as 
opposed to just the mean CARs for each index value). This line is clearly positive in 
slope. This is consistent with the notion that firms in industries with higher external 
finance dependence scores were thought by the market to benefit more from 
demonetization than firms from industries with lower scores. This result when taken 
together with the result for the banking sector suggests that when banks obtain more 
funds the market expects that these funds will be disbursed to firms in those industries 
that are more dependent on external finance. 
As further evidence consistent with this account we note that the pharmaceutical 
industry is the one industry (outside of banking) to show a consistently positive and 
significant result (see Table 3).  Pharmaceuticals are the most external finance dependent 
industry, according to the Rajan-Zingales measure. The next most external finance 
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dependent industry is telecommunications, which experienced a positive and significant 
reaction in some specifications in Table 3. We treat this evidence as consistent with the 
account that the increase in deposits is perceived by the market to profit banks and 
benefits those sectors that are the most likely to seek bank finance. 
 Assessing whether this apparent market expectation was reasonable is quite 
complicated. One of the key conditions for this account is that individuals did not 
withdraw their deposited amounts quickly or at least left them in the banks long enough 
that banks would have sufficient time to invest these funds and earn returns to justify the 
large CARs. The magnitude of the market reaction cannot be readily explained without 
assuming that the market expected a fairly persistent increase in bank deposits and 
financial depth.45 
In the first few weeks after the announcement it appears that deposits outpaced 
withdrawals by around a ratio of 4 to 1.46 One simple explanation for this is that the 
government had limited the withdrawal amounts since demonetization was announced to 
levels that are substantially below those for deposits. This naturally creates an imbalance. 
However, even as the limits on withdrawals were gradually lifted (a process that was 
completed by March 13, 2017) it does not appear that withdrawals have increased 
dramatically.  One explanation for this is that following shortly after the demonetization 
announcement, the government made various changes to the law that might have 
enhanced the visibility of moves to withdraw large amounts of money and appear to be 
using those laws to target their tax evasion enforcement efforts. These steps might also 
                                                        
45 The aggregate market capitalization of the banks in our sample at the end of the estimation window (i.e. 
on November 3, 2016) was about INR 13.5 trillion. The market reaction of about 6% thus implies an 
increase in (after-tax) value of about INR 0.8 trillion; in turn (assuming a 35% corporate income tax rate), 
this requires a pretax increase in value of INR 1.2 trillion. World Bank data (available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.LNDP?end=2016&start=1960) suggests a global average 
interest rate spread between deposits and loans of about 6% (although the figure for India is missing). 
Using this 6% spread, it would be necessary for loanable deposits to increase by INR 20 trillion for one 
year in order to generate an additional return of INR 1.2 trillion. This significantly exceeds the INR 15 
trillion amount that was deposited following demonetization (see e.g. "97% of scrapped notes deposited 
with banks as on Dec 30: Report”, Times of India, January 5, 2017, available at: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-features/business/97-of-scrapped-notes-deposited-with-banks-as-on-
dec-30-report/articleshow/56344692.cms). 
46 Sunny Verma, “Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana: Post ‘last chance’ IDS, comes a new 
declaration scheme”, Indian Express, November 29, 2016.  Available at: 
http://indianexpress.com/article/business/business-others/pradhan-mantri-garib-kalyan-yojana-ids-scheme-
4400491/.  
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make people more concerned about withdrawing large amounts.47  Further, some of the 
schemes the government provided between November 9, 2016 and December 30, 2016 
(such as the Taxation and Investment Regime for Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana) 
allow depositors to retain more of their deposits value if they leave it untouched with the 
bank for some time – thereby limiting withdrawals as well. It is, however, possible that 
withdrawals rates will begin to pick up over time. On the other hand, it is also possible 
that people may increasingly prefer to be in the formal sector and get the advantages that 
it increasingly offers (e.g., e-payments).48 Which of these future behavioral patterns is 
more likely is difficult to conclusively determine at this time, although early evidence 
suggests withdrawals may have declined.49 
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) changed the incremental reserve ratio for banks 
to prevent an increase in lending out of the new deposits. Such a measure would, had it 
persisted, have affected the ability of banks to generate profits from the new deposits. 
However, this measure was short-lived. It was announced on November 26, 2016 as a 
temporary measure that would be revisited or expire on or before December 09, 
2016.  On December 07, 2016 the RBI announced that the November 26 measure would 
be removed with effect from December 10, 2016.50                                                         
47 It also appears that from April 1, 2017 cash transactions in excess of INR 200,000 are prohibited. “Cash 
transaction limit slashed to Rs. 2 lakh”, The Hindu, March 22, 2017.  Available at: 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cash-transaction-limit-slashed-to-rs-2-lakh/article17561911.ece.  
48 See e.g., Prithraj Panigrahi, “Bank Deposit Growth Continues even as Restriction on Cash Withdrawals 
are Removed”, CEIC Blog, May 26, 2017.  Available at: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/blog/india-banks-
liquidity. “Cash withdrawal from banks falling at faster pace after demonetization”, News Nation, April 04, 
2017, available at: http://www.newsnation.in/business-news/economy/cash-withdrawal-from-banks-falling-
at-faster-pace-after-demonetisation-article-167128.html. 
 It is also an interesting, albeit open, question what people who had deposited unaccounted for 
money would do after it was deposited.  These individuals would have paid some money to effect the 
deposit – either to intermediaries for evading the higher taxes or to the government in the form of taxes and 
penalties.  However, once that occurs and the fees/penalties have been paid what is the advantage of taking 
the money out of your account to push back into “black” money?  If one wanted to use the cash for 
corruption payments and so forth then it would presumably be better to do that with cash than directly from 
bank account payments. However, taking out large amounts of cash is bound to attract law enforcement 
attention, thus increasing the risk of being caught or the risk of having to pay additional bribes to prevent 
additional law enforcement scrutiny. At the margin the value of keeping cash should have reduced 
somewhat (though how much is hard to tell this early on). 
49 Ibid., and “RBI need not print entire amount of extinguished currency: Report”, Money Control, March 
31, 2017.  Available at:  
http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/economy/rbi-need-not-print-entire-amount-of-extinguished-
currency-report-2250553.html. 
50 See RBI Circular, DBR.No.Ret.BC.41/12.01.001/2016-17, November 26, 2016 imposing limit and RBI 
Circular, DBR.No.Ret.BC.46/12.01.001/2016-17, December 7, 2016 removing limit. 
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For our purposes the key issue is whether the market reaction around November 
8, 2016 for the banking sector is plausible given the potentiality for withdrawals 
following deposits. We think the market is likely to have thought that individuals 
depositing large amounts of money may not try to immediately withdraw those funds 
both because there were limits on withdrawals, but also because it might invite unwanted 
scrutiny for a variety of reasons. Although some of the enhanced scrutiny methods came 
shortly after the event window (suggesting that the market may not have known of them), 
these methods were probably in a class of steps one might anticipate a government would 
take after taking a huge political risk like demonetization of the scale adopted in India. 
Moreover, some of the unattractiveness of taking large withdrawals from bank accounts 
were present before demonetization too (e.g., the PMLA). In light of this, it appears 
reasonable to think that the market expected a good portion of the deposits would not be 
withdrawn in the short to medium term.51 
5.3) Explaining the SOE Result  
To probe the SOE result further, we note that many of India’s banks are SOEs and 
perhaps the bank SOEs are driving the overall SOE result.  In Table 5, we examine this 
question. Column (1) simply confirms the results we have obtained thus far. Column (2) 
excludes all SOEs and finds a positive and significant result of around 5% for non-SOE 
banks. This indicates that the banking sector effect applies to non-SOE banks (as well as 
to SOE banks). Column (3) includes only SOEs and finds that the bank dummy is 
positive and significant with an even larger coefficient (~8%). Finally, Column (4) 
excludes banks and finds that the SOE dummy is still significant and positive at around 
3%. These results suggest that it is not the bank SOEs that are driving the overall SOE 
results (see Column (4)) and that even SOE banks report higher coefficients than non-
SOE banks (though the difference is not statistically significant). These results are 
consistent with the notion that SOEs experience an independent effect. 
                                                        
51 Consistent with this expectation are news reports suggesting that a large bank, the State Bank of India, 
was faced with the challenge of finding suitable investment opportunities for the extra deposits it received – 
see Vishwanath Nair “Demonetisation Leaves State Bank of India Scrambling To Deploy Surplus 
Deposits” BloombergQuint, May 23, 2017, available at: 
https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/2017/05/23/demonetisation-leaves-state-bank-of-india-
scrambling-to-deploy-surplus-deposits. 
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To explore this further, we examine the market reaction in relation to the 
corruption index for the sample of non-bank SOEs. Although this restricts the sample size 
to 47, the result (presented visually in Figure 5) is intriguing. Here we see that the lower 
the corruption score (i.e., the more corrupt the industry) the stronger the effect. In other 
words, SOEs in industries that are thought to be more corrupt appear to have a larger 
CARs, consistent with the notion that demonetization appears to have increased the value 
of SOEs, particularly in corrupt industries. Although the relationship in Figure 5 is not 
statistically significant (perhaps due to the small sample size), the pattern is intriguing.   
The SOE results are consistently positive and significant but are somewhat 
difficult to explain. One explanation is that demonetization has changed the outlook of 
SOEs from having multiple aims to being primarily profit motivated and that the market 
is picking up on that. This seems unlikely. Second, the increase in deposits at banks, 
many of which are state owned, might lead to more funds being available for SOEs. 
While we cannot exclude this account, we think it is not very likely. Few SOEs are 
considered very profitable and so SOEs are unlikely to be particularly appealing as 
borrowers from the perspective of non-state owned banks. Of course, this does not 
preclude SOE banks from engaging in such financing of SOEs for non-profit driven 
reasons. However, if bank SOEs were likely to provide capital to poorly performing 
SOEs, then we would expect to see that the market would respond by having a larger 
positive reaction to private banks thank to SOE banks on the announcement of 
demonetization. Table 4 Columns (3) and (4) show that the market responded in the 
opposite manner – SOE banks have an even larger positive reaction than private banks 
(although this is not statistically significant). For these reasons, we are skeptical that 
access to the incremental bank deposits is what explains this result.   
Third, it is conceivable that if the Government obtains an increase in tax 
collections then that might inure to the benefit of SOEs by providing them with more 
capital. There is some evidence of an increase in at least municipal tax collections since 
demonetization.52 However, this does not explain why non-bank SOEs in more corrupt                                                         
52  See Moushumi Das Gupta “Demonetisation windfall: Civic agencies record 268% increase in tax 
collection” Hindustan Times, November 23, 2016, available at:  
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/demonetization-windfall-civic-agencies-record-268-increase-
in-tax-collection/story-O3YsryY0WtdefZy8vdBMFM.html 
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industries seem to have a more positive reaction than those in less corrupt industries 
(though this result is not significant). 
We think a fourth explanation may be worth examining – that the potential 
corruption reducing effects of demonetization might be showing up in results on SOEs.  
This builds on the notion that one of the key reasons why some industries are considered 
more prone to corruption than others is interaction with the government or because of 
regulation (which of course involves interactions with the government). If interaction 
with the government can be a proxy for corruption risk, then being owned by the 
government (or being an arm of the government) might similarly be a proxy for 
corruption risk. If this is correct then if demonetization is perceived by the market to 
reduce corruption (directly or indirectly) then we would expect to see an increase in 
CARs for SOEs. 
If this SOE result is the result of reduced perceptions of corruption then that raises 
questions about why that might be. One explanation is that SOEs are – for reasons just 
discussed – more likely to suffer from corruption and hence more likely to benefit from 
any perceived reductions in corruption. Moreover, it is possible that the extent to which 
SOEs are susceptible to corruption, relative to non-SOEs, is much greater than the 
differences in corruption among non-SOEs that the Transparency International and other 
indices seek to capture. This can potentially explain a large effect for SOEs, even though 
there is little evidence that market reactions to demonetization were related to the 
prevalence of corruption in different industries. 
 In addition, when the government decided to act in an unprecedented manner that 
carried great political and economic risk, it may have sent a (quite costly) signal about its 
seriousness in curtailing corruption. Much scholarly discussion of corruption envisages it 
as an equilibrium in which expectations are self-fulfilling. The government taking this 
large and potentially very risky step is likely to make people reconsider their expectations 
and perhaps move the equilibrium. It may be that the if demonetization is treated as a 
signal of future anti-corruption efforts then perhaps the place where the government may 
first tackle these issues is in SOEs as the government is most able to influence their 
behavior. Broadly speaking, the marginal productivity of the government’s greater 
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likelihood of policing corruption is likely highest where there is the most corruption and 
where the government has the greatest ability to influence it – the SOE sector.   
In addition to the intrinsic interest in this finding it also raises the prospect – 
which is to be the best of our knowledge not pursued in depth in the corruption literature 
– that the ownership of firms may also serve as a proxy for corruption risk along with 
industry.  SOEs may proxy for interaction with the state as does industry. Further, foreign 
ownership (due to their home country standards) and business groups (due to opacity) 
may also serve as useful indicia of corruption risk (although they do not experience 
consistently different returns in the context that we study). We think this may prove to be 
an intriguing additional measure of corruption risk to those that already exist in the 
literature.  However, we leave further inquiry into that for future research. 
 
6) Conclusion 
India’s November 8, 2016 demonetization was perhaps one of the most dramatic 
moves a government has made in the name of reducing corruption and tax evasion.  
Although a full assessment of the effects of demonetization is surely many years away, 
stock market reactions around the announcement date provide a window into investors’ 
expectations about the longer-term impact of demonetization on different sectors of the 
economy and on different types of firms. They also potentially provide insights into the 
phenomena of corruption and tax evasion, and the channels through which tools to 
address them may operate. 
We compute abnormal returns for firms on the Indian stock market around this 
event, and compare patterns of abnormal returns for different subsamples of firms 
defined by industry, ownership structure, and other characteristics. We find little 
evidence that sectors thought to be associated with greater tax evasion or corruption 
experienced significantly different returns. However, we find substantial positive returns 
for banks and for SOEs. The effect for banks appears to indicate a market expectation of 
a persistent increase in the form of savings from unaccounted-for cash to bank deposits – 
i.e. an increase in financial depth. This is reinforced by a pattern of higher returns for 
industries that are characterized by a greater dependence on external finance, which 
possibly reflects an expectation of an easing of financial constraints. The returns for 
33
Khanna and Dharmapala:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2017
 33 
SOEs may be due to possible indirect effects of the announcement on perceptions of 
future corruption among these firms. This effect highlights the need for further inquiry 
into how SOE status affects perceptions of corruption. 
As was highlighted earlier, there are many important caveats regarding inferences 
from stock market reactions. Most importantly, there is no guarantee that investors’ 
expectations will turn out to be correct, especially for such an unprecedented event. 
Nonetheless, stock market reactions represent a valuable “first rough draft” of the effects, 
given investors’ knowledge and financial incentives to predict these effects correctly.  
It is also important to bear in mind that these stock market reactions do not tell us 
whether demonetization was an economic and development success or failure. There are 
many complex benefits and costs – such as the extensive economic disruption – that 
would have to be taken into account to make an overall assessment. The stock market 
reactions that we study provide only a partial picture, but these types of effects are an 
important element of any overall evaluation. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
Observations 
CARs: 
   
(-1, +1) Window 0.0324 0.0680 2927 
(-2, +2) Window 0.0276 0.0809 2992 
(-3, +3) Window -0.0060 0.0963 3029 
    
Ownership Variables:    
SOE = 1 0.0337 0.1804 3415 
Business Group = 1 0.0340 0.1812 3415 
Foreign-owned = 1 0.3593 0.4799 3415 
    
Financial Statement Variables:    
Total Assets 123177.3 904798.9 1661 
Profits 11653.55 73767.38 1661 
Sales 34031.98 73767.38 1507 
Advertising Expenditures 93.33 936.5891 3415 
Marketing Expenditures 189.33 1729.675 3415 
    
Other Variables:    
Corruption Index 6.699 0.5023 2125 
External Dependence 0.1805 0.7321 1516 
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the demonetization event are 
computed using the market model, and are Winsorized at 5%. The ownership variables 
for State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), business group firms and foreign-owned firms are 
indicator variables from Prowess. Financial statement variables are also from Prowess, 
and are reported in millions of INR. Missing values for advertising and marketing 
expenditures are treated as zeroes. The corruption index is from Transparency 
International (2011). The external dependence measure captures industry-level 
dependence on external finance, and is from Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiehl (2007), 
representing an updated version of the measure constructed in Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
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Table 2: CARs for the Real Estate and Banking Sectors and for SOEs around 
November 8, 2016  
Sector Window 
(-3, +3) 
Market Reaction 
Mean CAR 
(Standard error) 
(Number of firms) 
 
Real Estate November 4 – November 15, 2016 -0.0217** 
(0.0095) 
(110) 
 
Banking 
 
November 4 – November 15, 2016 0.0614*** 
(0.0110) 
(66) 
 
State-Owned Firms November 4 – November 15, 2016 0.0407*** 
(0.00867) 
(89) 
 
Note: This table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the 
demonetization event. CARs are computed using the market model, and are Winsorized 
at 5%. The event window is a [-3, +3] window around the November 8, 2016 
announcement of demonetization. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*: significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3: Stock Market Reactions around November 8, 2016, by Industry and 
Ownership 
 (1) 
Event 
Window:  
(-1, +1) 
(2) 
Event 
Window:  
(-2, +2) 
(3) 
Event 
Window:  
(-3, +3) 
(4) 
Event 
Window:  
(-3, +3) 
  
Dependent Variable: CAR around Nov. 8, 2016 
 
Banks = 1 0.02287*** 0.03806*** 0.05952*** 0.06462*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.022) 
Real Estate = 1 -0.01296* -0.01055 -0.01388 -0.02861** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) 
Mining = 1 0.00787 0.00240 -0.02910* -0.02475 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.024) 
Electricity = 1 -0.02353** -0.01109 -0.00725 -0.01759 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) 
Pharmaceuticals 0.01737*** 0.01887*** 0.01800** 0.01975** 
and Health = 1 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
Telecommunications 0.03225** 0.01930 0.03578* 0.03304 
= 1 (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) 
Information  -0.00888* -0.00714 0.00063 0.01449 
Technology = 1 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) 
State-Owned = 1 0.03341*** 0.03696*** 0.03574*** 0.04333*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) 
Foreign-Owned = 1 -0.00064 0.00036 -0.00482 -0.00074 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) 
Business Group = 1 0.01014*** 0.00956*** -0.00331 0.00297 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Controls for Total     
Assets, Profits, Sales No No No Yes 
Advertising, and     
Marketing?     
Constant 0.02727*** 0.02201*** -0.00718*** -0.01082** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
     
Observations 2,927 2,992 3,029 1,271 
R-squared 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.034 
Note: This table reports regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) for various event windows - [-1, +1], [-2, +2], and [-3, +3] - around the November 8, 2016 
announcement of demonetization. CARs are computed using the market model, and are Winsorized at 5%. 
Industry dummies are constructed using the 5-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC) codes reported 
in the Prowess database. Ownership type and controls for total assets, profits, sales, advertising, and 
marketing are all from the Prowess database; missing values of advertising and marketing expenditures are 
set to zero. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*: significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: Stock Market Reactions and External Financial Dependence 
 
 (1) 
Event 
Window: 
(-1, +1) 
(2) 
Event 
Window: 
(-2, +2) 
(3) 
Event 
Window: 
(-3, +3) 
(4) 
Event 
Window: 
(-3, +3) 
  
Dependent Variable: CAR around Nov. 8, 2016 
 
External Dependence 0.00435*** 0.00492** 0.00839** 0.00987** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
Corruption Index -0.00736 -0.00768 -0.00378 -0.00144 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) 
     
Controls for Ownership     
Type, Total Assets,  No No No Yes 
Profits, Sales 
Advertising,  
    
and Marketing?     
     
Constant 0.08639* 0.08069 0.01202 -0.00400 
 (0.044) (0.059) (0.076) (0.092) 
     
Observations 1,198 1,214 1,222 514 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.044 
Note: This table reports regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) for various event windows - [-1, +1], [-2, +2], and [-3, +3] - 
around the November 8, 2016 announcement of demonetization. CARs are computed 
using the market model, and are Winsorized at 5%. The external dependence measure is 
from Kroszner et al. (2007), and represents an updated version of the Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) measure. The external dependence measure is constructed by International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) code for manufacturing industries. The ISIC 
codes are matched to the 5-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC) codes in 
Prowess using the concordance in Sivadasan (2009). The corruption index is from 
Transparency International. Ownership type (state-owned, foreign-owned and business 
group) and controls for total assets, profits, sales, advertising, and marketing are all from 
the Prowess database; missing values of advertising and marketing expenditures are set to 
zero. Robust standard errors clustered at 5-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC) 
level are reported in parentheses.  
*: significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.    
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Table 5: Stock Market Reactions for Banks and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
 
 (1) 
All Firms 
(2) 
Excluding 
SOEs 
(3) 
SOEs 
(4) 
Excluding 
Banks 
 
  
Dependent Variable: CAR around Nov. 8, 2016 
Event Window: (-3, +3) 
 
Banks = 1 0.05927*** 0.05193*** 0.08197***  
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.017)  
     
State-Owned = 1 0.03638***   0.03142*** 
 (0.009)   (0.009) 
     
Constant -0.00833*** -0.00822*** 0.02320** -0.00822*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
     
Observations 3,029 2,940 89 2,963 
R-squared 0.015 0.005 0.171 0.002 
Note: This table reports regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) for a [-3, +3] event window around the November 8, 2016 
announcement of demonetization. CARs are computed using the market model, and are 
Winsorized at 5%. Industry dummies are constructed using the 5-digit National Industrial 
Classification (NIC) codes reported in the Prowess database. Ownership type is from the 
Prowess database. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*: significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.    
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Figure 1: Stock Market Reactions and the Transparency International Measure of 
Corruption by Sector 
 
 
Note: This graph shows a scatterplot representing the mean CAR for each value of the 
Transparency International (2011) measure of corruption by sector. Higher values of this 
corruption index indicate lower levels of perceived corruption. Only the mean CAR is 
shown, as there are only a limited number of values taken by the index. The line of best 
fit is, however, computed using all of the CARs (as opposed to just the mean CARs for 
each index value). CARs are computed using the market model, and are Winsorized at 
5%. 
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Figure 2: Abnormal Returns for the Portfolio of Banks 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the abnormal returns within the (-3, +3) event window for a 
portfolio consisting of all the banks in our sample.  
Figure 3: Abnormal Returns for the Portfolio of State-Owned Firms (SOEs) 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the abnormal returns within the (-3, +3) event window for a 
portfolio consisting of all the SOEs in our sample. 
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Figure 4: Stock Market Reactions and External Financial Dependence by Sector 
 
 
Note: This graph shows a scatterplot representing the mean CAR for each value of the 
external financial dependence measure from Kroszner et al. (2007), which represents an 
updated version of the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure. The external dependence 
measure is constructed by International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) code for 
manufacturing industries. The ISIC codes are matched to the 5-digit National Industrial 
Classification (NIC) codes in Prowess using the concordance in Sivadasan (2009). Only 
the mean CAR is shown, as there are only a limited number of values taken by the index. 
The line of best fit is, however, computed using all of the CARs (as opposed to just the 
mean CARs for each index value). CARs are computed using the market model, and are 
Winsorized at 5%.              
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Figure 5: Stock Market Reactions and the Transparency International Measure of 
Corruption for Nonbank State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)  
 
Note: This graph shows a scatterplot representing the mean CAR for nonbank SOEs, for 
each value of the Transparency International (2011) measure of corruption by sector. 
Higher values of this corruption index indicate lower levels of perceived corruption. Only 
the mean CAR is shown, as there are only a limited number of values taken by the index. 
The line of best fit is, however, computed using all of the CARs (as opposed to just the 
mean CARs for each index value). CARs are computed using the market model, and are 
Winsorized at 5%. 
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